Presumably the congressinal response will depend on some evidence of progress toward a ddtente that is more than a oneway street for aid to the Soviet Union. When the President requests an increase in the ceiling. an opportunity will be provided for reassessing the economic implications. as well as the progress in overall political relations. At this juncture the question of credits to the Soviet Union is mooted by the emigration provisions of the Trade Actthe enactment of the Jackson amendment and the socalled Kissinger compromise. No credits are available until the President certifies that he has received assurances of progress on the emigration question. At the present time. he cannot deliver such a certificate because Foreign Minister Gromyko has disclosed that the Congress was misled. there never was a Kissinger compromiseexcept perhaps in the vaguest of forms. The efforts afoot to eliminate the credit ceiling miss the point. $300 million of credits would be immediately available. except for the hurdles of the Trade Act. Elimination of the ceiling would do nothing to change Soviet policies on emigration and. therefore. the credit ban of the Trade Act will continue in effect. It is unrealistic to expect any significant movement on this issue In the immediate future. On both sides positions have been taken which reflect deeply held views from which neither side can be expected to retreat under pressure from the other. The spectacle of U.S. officials and prominent American businessmen obsequiously. or hungrily. joining Soviet officials on American soil to deplore or misrepresent American policy only hardens the resistance in the Congress. The emigration provision of the Trade Act reflects high ideals. Not many are willing to subordinate them under pressure or for cash sales in the Soviet Union. The $300 million ceiling reflects a sober concern for the economic and political consequences and the price of dollar diplomacy.
Keywords matched
emigration