Speech #1010044720

Instead of assuming what we know to be true.. which is that Jews and Evangelical Christians in the Soviet Union are faced with persecution and have a wellfounded fear should they return to the Soviet Union of that kind of persecution. we ask each and every one of them to prove the case for him or herself. The result of that process. while seeming fair on the surface. has been disastrous. First and foremost. instead of the Soviet Union being the bottleneck between free immigration for these individuals and their opportunity in the United States. it became the processing of these individuals by the United States that became the process. and instead of being in the position to declare a great victory in our human rights struggle about immigration we were faced with administrative problems of a significant sort with respect to allowing these individuals to enter. This legislation does nothing to upset the balance of the Refugee Act of 1980. It merely implements within the ambit of that Act procedural efficiencies with r( spect to individuals about whom we have knowledge as a group. We are imposing by this legislation a practice with respect to Soviet Jews and Evangelical Christians which has already been well established with respect to 24 different groups of individuals in Southeast Asia. the use of a presumption to say that if you are a member of that group you are known to be a target of persecution. and if you come to the officials of the INS and ask that you be made a refugee on the basis of your fear of that persecution. you are entitled to be treated as a refugee. In the absence of that kind of standard. we have seen refusal rates with respect to Jews in Italy being screened by the United States varying from a low number of approximately 6 percent fast fall. swelling up to 38 percent in the spring. and in June being over 20 percent. The numbers have had enough of an impact. but the truth is that the result has been divided families. brothers and sisters. two brothers. husbands and wives as compared to the children or grandparents. situations in which families have been treated differently despite having virtually identical experiences in the Soviet Union. This legislation seeks to cure that problem and to add an efficient processing to those people who are waiting for refugee adjudication by the United States in Italy and in the Soviet Union. By implementing this legislation we will clear up the huge backlog that currently exists. We currently have a backlog of 12.000 individuals in Italy waiting for adjudication or who have been turned down under the prior casebycase processing. It is the purpose of this legislation to do away with those backlogs and to allow those individuals to come to the United States. This legislation is not permanent legislation. it is for the next 15 months. During that period we are going to have to face up to the consequences of lowered barriers for immigration in the Soviet Union and the challengers that presents for us. for Israel. and for other nations in the West. But we ought not to solve that problem by creating a huge backlog among those who in good faith and in expectation of coming to the United States have left the Soviet Union and are now knocking on our door. Let us not be the country that says no to their knock. and use this legislation that will open that door. and also open the opportunity in a studied and appropriate way to prepare the world for the day that we hope for. which is when the Soviet Union will recognize the right of all of its people to free immigration. Madam Chairman. H.R. 2022 has two primary purposes. First. and foremost. it is designed to promote the effective and efficient processing of applications for refugee status by establishing a legislative presumption that Jews. as well as Evangelical Christians. are subject to persecution In the Soviet Union. Second. the bill would allow some 5.000 to 10.000 Soviet and Indochinese individuals who have been. or will be. allowed to come to the United States and remain here permanently. pursuant to the Attorney Generals Juy1.1989 parole authority. to adjust their status from that of a parolee to that of a refugee. H.R. 2022 was ordered favorably reported by the full Judiciary Committee on June 20 by a recorded vote of 30 to 5. I am delighted to say that the bill has over 90 cosponsors and has received strong support from both sides of the aisle. With the enactment of the JacksonVanlk amendment in 1974 and the signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975. the United States made it clear that the relaxation of Soviet emigration policy was a vital goal of U.S. foreign policy. For a while it appeared that our efforts were bearing fruit. From 1976 to 1979 the number of persons permitted to leave the Soviet Union rose steadily. from 26.000 to 62.000. But in the 1980s it became apparent that Soviet emigration policy in fact bore either no relationship or a negative relationship to the force with which we attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to permit greater freedom of movement. In 1986. for example. Soviet emigration totaled less than 2.000. and the number of refuseniks grew to over 11.000. For reasons not fully understood. Soviet emigration policy took another one of its cyclical swings in 1987. Jewish emigration increased ninefold to 8.155. In 1988. 19.165 were allowed to leave. and this year that number will be at least doubled. It is important to remember. however. that the Soviet government has still not established a standard. formal emigration procedure. Instead. they have employed a series of different requirements for different groups of applicants and have altered those requirements at their discretion. without warning. Thus. we have no way of knowing whether this more liberal emigration policy reflects fundamental changes in Soviet human rights practices or whether it constitutes merely a temporary response designed to meet some shortterm policy objective. One might have thought that as doors of emigration opened wider for Soviet citizens the United States would have responded with enthusiasm. encouragement andabove allwith a generous refugee admissions and resettlement policy. Unfortunately. that was not the case. for in August 1988 Attorney General Meese ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to require each and every Soviet applicant for refugee status to establish individually that he or she either had been persecuted or could demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution. I have little doubt that in the case of Soviet armenians the Attorney Generals decision to reverse a 40year practice of deeming all Soviet emigres refugees was a correct one. But in the case of Soviet Jews and Evangelical Christiansthat is. Pentecostals and Baptiststhe new policy made little sense. for by every account Jews and Evangelical Christians. as a group. continue to be persecuted In the Soviet Union.