Speech #960300366

The establishment of a program of better cooperation between the Federal Government agencies at Fort McCoy and the law enforcement offices of the surrounding communities. Fourth. An increase in the number of INS personnel. at the refugee compounds and the temporary deputization by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti of sufficient numbers of State and local law enforcement officials to enable them to detain and return escapees from Fort McCoy. Fifth. The establishment of mandatory education and culture assimilation programs for all age groups of refugees. Sixth. The utilization of military transport aircraft. where practical and feasible. to transport refugees to their resettlement destinations. Seventh. Full Federal reimbursement of State and local resettlementassociated costs. as provided by the FascellLehman amendment to the fiscal year 1980 supplemental appropriations bill. Eighth. Segregation of mentally retarded and mentally ill refugees from the criminal and homosexual element within the compounds. Ninth. The establishment of better monitoring procedures for refugees placed with and in the custody of sponsors. Tenth. The establishment of a permanent policy governing the transferral of refugees to Federal prisons. or other institutions in the case of those with special problems making them more difficult to resettle. Eleventh. The development by the State Department or the INS of specific repatriation procedures for Cubans seeking to return to Cuba. From day one. the administrations handling of the refugees at Fort McCoy was awkward and lacked direction. Since there were no specific guidelines for many situations. no one was sure who could or should do what. so we had a lot of bureaucratic wheelspinning. First. the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was given the responsibility for coordinating the various refugee programs at Fort McCoy. FEMA was established as a disaster relief agency to handle disasters created by floods. hurricanes. blizzards. and so forth. FEMA was not created to coordinate programs for 119.000 Cuban refugees unable to speak English. having limited knowledge of American customs. having a large percentage of criminals within their ranks. and unanimously needing to be resettled. This mismatch was finally recognized and in July. coordination and management of the refugee compounds was taken over by the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Unfortunately. this stumbling about has fostered some of the problems now faced by the refugees at Fort McCoy. For example. from conversations with Governor Dreyfus office and Fort McCoy employees. I must conclude the internal government of the Cubans is out of control. The large number of criminal refugees at Fort McCoy. and the poor or complete lack of supervision there have created a situation in which the infrastructure of the refugee selfgovernment appears to have been taken over by strong men and their gangs. like the Eagles and the Warhawks. vying for control of the remaining refugees in the camp. I have also been informed there is a black market within the refugee compound for which these different groups are struggling for control. This black market. I am told. includes drugs. homosexual activity. prostitution. et cetera. Admittedly. part of the reason for the thugs taking control is these undesirables comprise a growing percentage of the refugee population at Fort McCoy that increases as the more desirable refugees are placed. However. it is still my opinion closer monitoring and stronger management of the situation by either FEMA. the State Department. or HHS could have prevented this from occurring. Second. as for the handling of the Cuban juvenile population. bureaucratic redtape must be cut so certain types of unaccompanied juveniles can be resettled as soon as possible.