But can we rely on these numbers as a true alteration in Soviet policy? I think not. A careful analysis of the coincidence of political events with their emigration policies in the past has led me to believe that the number of visas issued related directly to the possibility that trade liberalizations might be imminent. It did not signal the kind of free emigration contemplated in the Helsinki Accords. Negotiations on mutually granting MFN status began in 1971 and resulted in the signing of two agreements in 1972. both providing for reciprocal granting of MFN status. It was not known until late 1974 or early 1975 that the agreements would not enter into force. Let us look at the emigration data. In 1971 emigration increased 40 percent over the entire previous decades total. In 1972 it was up another 125 percent over the 1971 total. Yet in 1973. the year after the signing of the agreements on the MFN. the increase in emigration amounted to only 6.3 percent. In 1974 emigration decreased 38.2 percent. It certainly appears that the increases in visas issued by the Soviet Union signaled its desire to reach an accord on trade. Conversely. the decrease can only be explained by their misreading of the political scene here in 1974 that they need do no more since a trade agreement was at hand. Thus we have allowed the lever of trade on the Soviet emigration policies to slip from our grasp. Instead. emigration is being used by the Soviet Union to manipulate us toward a negotiation for a liberalization of trade. Now. with the issuance of 50.000 visas. we might run the risk of being deceived. I suggest that we should stand firm and continue to use the possibility of expanded trading status to bring about permanent changes in Soviet emigration policies and press the Soviet Union to recognize free emigration as a legal obligation they must respect as a matter of international law. Mr. Speaker.
Keywords matched
emigration visas