As I pointed out in my testimony on March 7. the United States cannot even begin any commercial negotiations with the Soviet Union for three years in the face of considerable pressure that we do not do so until the Soviet Union had satisfied certain international standards of conduct which we thought were necessary before a more normal trading relationship could be established. It was only after the Soviet Union began to practice greater restraint in certain important areas that we began these commercial negotiations. Now with respect to the Soviet emigration practices. we face the dilemma that It is highly unusual. in fact. I know of very few precedents In international relations. where the domestic relationz of another country becomes the subject of an international quid pro quo. and we. therefore. had to find a formula wich would satisfy the concerns of those who were concerned with the emlgration issue and at the same time the Soviets refusal to make this the subject of a statetostate negotiation. I would also like to point out that even prior to this we had made repeated presentations to the Soviet Union. which we did not publicize. on the issue of emigration. and these presentations were clearly not without effect because Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union rose between 1949 and 1973 from a rate of 400 a year to a rate of 33.500. Now. what I have attempted to set down before this committee. Senator. is a formula by which the Soviet leaders explain their domestic practices and legislation to us in the form of certain clarifications. assurances and information.
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emigration