Speech #890184889

He was accompanied to the hearing by Mr. George Goss. AID refugee program coordinator in Washington. The hearing followed the Honolulu conference between President Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders whose joint communique specifically recognized the important need of a substantive program among the refugees in South Vietnam. The hearing indicated. however. that while some progress had been made over the past few months in developing a viable policy and program for the refugees. it was also true that the task had only begun. and that a needed sense of urgency and creative direction in this matter was not clearly in evidence. especially on the part of the South Vietnamese Government. After more than 7 months of continuous activity there is. in fact. little evidence to suggest that the governments involved have moved significantly beyond a backstopping position in providing care and protection to the refugees--even in the immediate area of emergency and shortterm custodial relief. This is illustrated by the tenor of Mr. Marks testimony. which emphasized intention and hope. rather than actualities and progress. and by his comment thatWe are giving our attention first to getting the most urgent supplies up to the refugees. and to getting the Government (South Vietnamese) to really focus attention on the problem. The fact that this situation continues to exist. gives me cause for serious concern. which I am sure is shared by my colleagues on the subcommittee. The testimony of Mr. Marks and Mr. Goss provided no assurance that adequate personnel existed in the U.S. missions office of refugee coordination to supplement adequately the limited activities of South Vietnamese officials. or to engage in planning and the estimating of future contingencies involving refugees. Additionally. in spite of the large number of refugee children and orphans there are no specialists in child welfare for example. and. in contrast to.the milltary. regular AID and refugee personnel are not stationed below the Provincial level of the South Vietnamese Government. Moreover. the testimony made cleai that most of the current planning fol refugees is still based on informal esti. mates regarding the nature and scope of the refugee problems. There is. for example. no accurate information on the number of refugee camps or centers. Little has been done in the way of surveys to determine more accurately refugee needs in housing. medical care. and education. In the area of education. Mr. Marks candidly stated that he did not know at this point whether the U.S. missions proposal to the South Vietnamese Government regarding the number of needed temporary classrooms. was in fact a "valid one." My response to this statement. and to the many similar statements made beforethe subcommittee over the last 7 months. is simply thishow can we talk about solving a refugee problem if we do not know. or cannot develop. information on the needs of the refugees? The continued ad hoc nature of refugee operations and the absence of an overall viable policy toward the refugee problem is most clearly reflected in the lack of definitive budgetary information on the part of both AID and the South Vietnamese Government. Beyond emergency and shortterm custodial relief. there are apparently no priorities currently given to substantive programs in education. cottage industries. vocational training. resettlement. and the like. even though in education. for example. the percentage of nonrefugee children in school exceeds that of the refugee children by nearly 50 percent. There has also been scant attention paid to refugee political action programs. which are recognized as possible and desirable in an effort to broaden and strengthen allegiance to the South Vietnamese Government among a significant cross section of its citizens. Although the South Vietnamese Government has Introduced some flexibility into its operation. in the main. it is still operating through the same diffuse and cumbersome machinery which existed many months ago. It has done little to recruit and train additional cadre to carry out a viable refugee program in the field. Moreover. little action to enforce whatever national decisions are made. has been taken in the Provinces. where the Province chiefs continue to make the final decisions regarding provisions for refugee assistance. There is little doubt in my mind that the resolve present on the battlefield is not yet present in the equally important task of natlonbuilding and developmentin educating the children. in caring for the orphans. in raising standards of health. in establishing cottage industries. vocational training centers. and agricultural programs. and in eradicating popular grievances on which insurgency feeds. I am hopeful that the Honolulu Conference declarations will have generated on the part of both Governments the sense of urgency and resolute action which is needed In all these areas.