Speech #710212787

The majority is again in error. When the Constitution was written the fathers certainly did not have in mind the case of an American woman who should lose her citizenship by marriage to a foreigner. Nor did they know anything of a naturalization law. Since that time the House. the Senate. and the President have not only exercised their constitutional rights in the passage of the Cable Act but is well in the passage of naturalization acts. For years the House of Representatives has recognized as legal and binding upon eligibles to the House of Representatives full compliance with the naturalization laws of the country. Shall we then conclude with the majority of the committee in this ease that in recognizing the binding force and effect of our ntaturalization laws the House has surrendered its constitutional right to be the sole judge of the qualifications of its Members? Certainly not. No one can with justification question the right of the Congress and the President to exercise their constitutional prerogatives in giving force to legislation defining citizenship status. whether it be through naturalization laws or through a law which. like the Cable Act. removes a penalty unjustly imposed by the Congress upon an American woman by reason of her marriage to a foreigner. When the law becomes effective. the House of Representatives recognizes it and then sits in judgntent upon the right of claimants to a seat in the House of Representatives and in so sitting it sits as the sole judge of House membership qualifications under the law and the facts. Inasmuch as the Congress. subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution. has written a naturalization law under whose present requirements five years residence in this country is imperative. the same Congress may. under pressure. reduce the 5year period of residence to one year. Should such athing eventuate. which is by no means improbable. the reasoning of the majority in the Owen case would prove a dangerous precedent. In such event. an Americanborn male citizen may have lived in this country but six years and then gone with his family to a foreign land (to Russia. for example). and upon attaining his majority. he may have sworn allegiance to the Russian Government. After a few years residence there as a mature Russian citizen. he could return to America under the new law. be naturalized after one years residence. and a year later make a successful run for Congress. claiming the right to be admitted to his seat by adding the six years. citizenship of his infancy to the 1year citizenship subsequent to his naturalization. Surely no one will seriously contend that the citizen in such a case would have purged himself of foreign influences and becotne imbued with the spirit of our institutions. To permit such a. citizen to take his seat in Congress would subvert the will of the fathers who decided that three years of citizenship was not sufficient for such purpose and insisted upon writing in the seven years citizenship requirement. There can be little doubt in writing in the seven years citizenship requirement. they had reference to the seven years next preceding the election. first. because they did not then have in mind the case of an Alnerican womn who had forfeited her citizenship through marriage. and second. they knew nothing of naturalization laws and did not have in mind the possibility of a repatriation which would tius open up the question of cumulative citizenship. There is another consideration which is conclusive in reasoning that the Cable Act goes further than merely to permit a married woman who has lost her citizenship under the expatriation iet to resume that citizenship. Let us repeat again. it is our contention that the Cable Act authorizes more than that maere resumption of citizenship which results in disconnected periods of citizenship and gives rise to the consideration of cumulative citizenship.