Speech #590160740

Minis v. United States. 15 Pet.. 423. 10 L. Ed.. 791) . and this proviso denotes the intention of Congress to exempt States and their immigration bureaus from a liability which might otherwise be incurred by the advertisement of their inducements to Immigrants. We are of opinion that any assurance of probable employment. definite as to the kind. the place. and the rate of wages. is a promise of employment within the meaning of the. statute. If this conclusion is correct. the advertisement published by the defendant was within the interdicted class. Obviously both the defendant and the alien regarded the advertisement as holding out a promise of employment specific enough to induce the alien to migrate and accomplish the purpose intended by the defendant. The question which was presented by the demurrer is not altogether free from doubt. especially in view of the very strict construction which the courts have placed upon the alien contract labor law. but we are constrained to the conclusion that the complaint was sufficient." (United States v. Baltic Mills Co.. 124 F. R.. 38. 40.) It thus appears that the object of both sections is substantially the same. namely. to prohibit not only the importation of foreign laborers under contract." which the strict interpretation of the courts. limiting the import of the word " contract" to its technical meaning. rendered difficult of enforcement. but the importation of such laborers in lursuance of any promises or inducements held out to them. as by advertisement. which. though not amounting to a contract. are nevertheless sufficient to bring about the immigration of the alien and to secure his services. So far as the prohibition against assisting the importation or immigration of foreign laborers by promise of employment through advertisements abroad is concerned. States and Territories are expressly excepted from the operation of the law. But does not the exception go further and exempt States and Territories. at least by implication. from the operation of the section directed against assisting the importation or migration of foreign laborers in pursuance of any offer. solicitation. promise. or agreement to perform labor in the United States? There would seem to be no reason on the score of policy why the exception should not apply in one case as well as the other. in view of the common object of both provisions. This conclusion is almost unavoidable when consideration is given to what is necessarily involved in the exception as expressed. By the terms of the proviso States and Territories may offer inducements or make promises to foreign laborers by advertisement printed and published in foreign countries. and they are not forbidden to "assist" in the immigration of the foreign laborers to whom such offers are addressed. What difference in principle can there be between soliciting laborers to come to the United States by advertisement and by letter or word of mouth? If the laborer responds to an appeal made to him by advertisement. he is just as much an imported alien laborer as if he yielded to any other form of solicitation. and comes just as actively into competition with domestic workmen. The fact is that by this proviso Congress has distinctly authorized States and Territories to encourage the immigration of foreign laborers when such a policy should seem to be required by local industrial conditions. And since Congress must have contemplated the actual immigration and employment of such laborers. it must be held to have authorized also the adoption and use of all reasonable and necessary measures looking to the assembling of such emigrants abroad. their transportation to this country. and their distribution among the industries of the State or Territorysuch practical measures. in other words. as may be appropriate for the protection of the immigrant on the one hand and for needs of the State or Territory on the other. A construction of this proviso or exception whlicl would restrict its application to the particular section in which it stands and allow to it no independent operation is opposed to the clearest canons of statutory interpretations. While "the office of a proviso. generally. is either to except something from the enacting clause or to qualify or restrain its generalities or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it as extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within Its purview " (Minis v.